Tim Hampton and the CTBT

by Dave Kimble at www.peakoil.org.au

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1996 by more than two-thirds of the UN Membership. Since that time 182 nations have signed the treaty, and 152 have gone on to ratify it.

Notable non-signers are: India, Pakistan and North Korea.
Those who have signed but not ratified the treaty include: US, Israel, China and Iran.

The rejection of ratification of the CTBT by the US Senate was in October 1999. The main reasons put forward for the rejection were principally those of verifiability. Since then however the scientific measures to ensure verifiability have developed significantly.

During the 2008 Presidential election campaign, Barack Obama said:

http://www.barackobama.com/2008/07/16/remarks_of_senator_barack_obam_95.php It’s time to send a clear message to the world: America seeks a world with no nuclear weapons. As long as nuclear weapons exist, we’ll retain a strong deterrent. But we’ll make the goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons a central element in our nuclear policy. We’ll negotiate with Russia to achieve deep reductions in both our nuclear arsenals and we’ll work with other nuclear powers to reduce global stockpiles dramatically. We’ll seek a verifiable global ban on the production of fissile material for weapons. And we’ll work with the Senate to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and then seek its earliest possible entry into force.

Senator McCain also went out of his way during the campaign to show willing on this difficult, formerly partisan issue:

As president, I will pledge to continue America’s current moratorium on testing, but also begin a dialogue with our allies, and with the U.S. Senate, to identify ways we can move forward to limit testing in a verifiable manner that does not undermine the security or viability of our nuclear deterrent. This would include taking another look at the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to see what can be done to overcome the shortcomings that prevented it from entering into force.

Speaking at a Carnegie Endowment for Peace function called "Nuclear weapons and deterence in the 21st century" in October 2008, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates was asked:

http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/1028_transcrip_gates_checked.pdf Q: Do you think the United States should ratify the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty? Sec. Gates: I think that if there are adequate verification measures, probably should. Yes, sir.

So where do we stand now on verifiability?

What is required is a verification system that does not give false positives or false negatives, which would only generate accusations, denial and controversy, and possibly lead to war. It is this element of controversy that has to be eliminated if the US Senate is to change its mind and ratify the treaty.

So when North Korea announced it would be conducting a weapon test in May 2009, in flagrant disregard of the CTBT, all eyes were on the verification system, to see how it would perform. Given that the system was told beforehand the location and rough timing of the event, there should be absolutely no doubt about the result, otherwise confidence in the CTBT would be severely shaken.

The result was the worst possible outcome - while the seismic data clearly indicated an explosion equivalent to 4,000 tonnes of TNT, the radionuclide results indicated no Xenon-133 signature at all. Nevertheless, the scientists were absolutely sure they knew what had happened:

http://www.ctbto.org/press-centre/highlights/2009/experts-sure-about-nature-of-the-dprk-event/?Fsize=kuyzyweqhcib Experts sure about nature of the DPRK event 12 June 2009 Around 500 verification technology experts from 86 countries gathered in Vienna, Austria, for the International Scientific Studies (ISS) Conference from 10 to 12 June 2009. The ISS project’s aim is to examine the capability of the verification regime of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) to detect nuclear explosions. Amongst the most discussed topics were the findings of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) on the nuclear test announced by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) on 25 May 2009. Scientists compared the seismic findings on both the 2006 and 2009 DPRK announced nuclear tests. In 2009, 61 stations had registered the event, compared to 22 stations in 2006. This has allowed for a more precise assessment of the event’s characteristics, including its location and magnitude. “Nuclear bluff” scenario dismissed Verification technology experts such as Professor Paul Richards from the Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory, Columbia University, USA, considered the scenario of a “bluff”, i.e. the creation of a nuclear explosion-like seismic signal using conventional explosives. While technically possible, he stated that it was highly implausible. As CTBTO seismic data have clearly indicated an explosion of a yield many times greater than that of 2006, it would have required several thousand tons of conventional explosives to be fired instantaneously. Richards explained that such a massive logistical undertaking would have been virtually impossible under the prevailing circumstances and would not have escaped detection. “To actually blow up a few million kilograms equivalent of conventional high explosives is not a trivial matter by any means.” - Professor Raymond Jeanloz, US National Academy of Sciences Accidental containment? The detection of radioactive noble gas, in particular xenon, could serve to corroborate the seismic findings. Contrary to the 2006 announced DPRK nuclear test, none of the CTBTO’s noble gas stations have detected xenon isotopes in a characteristic way that could be attributed to the DPRK event so far, even though the system is working well and the network’s density in the region is considerably higher than in 2006. Through a method called Atmospheric Transport Modelling (ATM) using high-quality global meteorological data, it is possible to backtrack the three-dimensional travel path of an airborne particle back to its possible source region. Based on ATM calculations and the low level levels of xenon measured by the International Monitoring System (IMS), experts infer that less than one part per thousand of the radioactive noble gas produced by a nuclear explosion was vented. Nor have CTBTO Member States using their own national technical means reported any such measurements. Given the relatively short half-life of radioactive xenon (between 8 hours and 11 days, depending on the isotope), it is unlikely that the IMS will detect or identify xenon from this event after several weeks. Experts at the ISS discussed possible reasons for a so-called “containment” preventing the emission of noble gases into the atmosphere from an underground nuclear test. This depends on many factors, which vary strongly from case to case and are hard to predict. No data are publicly available that explain why this test was contained whereas the test in October 2006 was not. Only an on-site inspection could bring clarity. The CTBT’s verification regime consists of three complementary elements: the 337 monitoring facilities of the International Monitoring System, the International Data Centre and, as the final verification measure, on-site inspections – challenge inspections involving up to 40 inspectors using a wide range of verification technologies. While the first two elements are already operating on a provisional basis, on-site inspections can only be invoked once the CTBT has entered into force. A definite clarification of the nature of the DPRK event could only be brought about through an on-site inspection. Had the Treaty already been in force, the scientific evidence collected so far by the CTBTO on the DPRK event of 25 May 2009 would have provided a firm basis for a decision by the CTBTO’s future Executive Council to dispatch an on-site inspection.

So there it is - after all that, the results were so ambiguous that the only way to be sure if it was a nuclear test or not was with an on-site inspection.

If North Korea had wanted to deny the test, they could have argued that it was not a nuclear test at all, as is proved by the total lack of any radio-Xenon readings. And since they haven't signed the CTBT, they are not obliged to submit to inspections.

What a farce - if Obama had persuaded the Senate to ratify the treaty on the grounds that the verification procedures were now water-tight, and then this happened, he would be a laughing stock.

The above media release was rushed out within 18 days of the event, but a more considered look was undertaken by CTBTO and published in the September 2009 issue of its in-house journal, "Spectrum". One of the co-authors was Tim Hampton, whose bio reads:

Tim Hampton joined the CTBTO in 1998 and is part of the team maintaining and operating the IDC [International Data Centre] application software to generate and distribute products and services. Prior to that, he worked in the UK for 10 years on test-ban monitoring issues.

The announced nuclear test in the DPRK on 25 May 2009 by Robert G. Pearce, Andreas Becker, Tim Hampton and Matthias Zähringer [DK: these are snippets from a 4 page document] When the DPRK announced a second nuclear test on 25 May this year, it was natural that Member States would again focus on IMS performance. Since 2006 the IMS has grown much closer to its eventual 321 monitoring stations, with an additional 65 stations having been certifed by May 2009. The capabilities of the International Data Centre (IDC) have also been further enhanced. Moreover, the IMS seismic signals showed that this event was larger [than the 2006 one - DK]. These factors conspired to provide us with high quality signals at many more IMS seismic stations. However, this time the IMS does not appear to have recorded relevant signals at its radioactive noble gas stations, which has come as a surprise to some. Following guidance from the Member States, IDC typically issues the REB [Reviewed Event Bulletin - DK] for any day within ten days. In view of the considerable interest generated among Member States by this event, an ‘expedited’ REB containing all the events for 25 May 2009 was issued on 27 May, in accordance with the envisaged post-EIF timeline. This was made possible by delaying the REBs for other days. Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind that while the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) makes available IMS data and IDC products to Member States, under the Treaty it remains the responsibility of the States to pass final judgment on their origin. A comprehensive simulation study of atmospheric transport and dilution showed that several IMS stations were in a position to detect a release at the time and place of DPRK2; in other words, air was indeed transported to IMS stations from the site of the event. However, the simulation together with the observations showed that none of these stations detected a visible signal that could be attributed to DPRK2. ... it is concluded that the containment of any generated xenon (under the hypothesis that this was a nuclear test) was above 99.9 percent.

This is a classic piece of back-side covering. The CTBTO wants to make it clear that although they now think they may have stuffed up, it never was their responsibility to actually decide if an event was a nuclear explosion or not - it is the responsibility of "the States" to pass final judgement. This is COMPLETE NONSENSE - the whole point of the exercise was to isolate the decision-making (on whether there was a nuclear explosion or not) from the politics.

Given the level of interest in CTBTO's ability to make a clear and unambiguous determination on an event, and its impact on the saleability of the CTBT to the six nuclear-armed powers that have not yet ratified, I imagine the pressure on Tim Hampton (and others) would have been considerable. Add to that the fact that this is all playing out at exactly the same time as the P5+1 are trying to block Iran from becoming a nuclear weapon power at talks in the same building complex in Vienna.

The CTBTO has denied that Hampton was part of those talks, but ratifying the CTBT is certainly on the agenda as part of the means by which Iran can give assurance of their good intentions, so Hampton was almost certainly available for advice from a back room.

However on 27th October 2009 Tim Hampton went to the 17th floor of building 'E', where he worked, and fell to the bottom of the stairwell 12 floors below.

The Mail on Sunday reported on 1st November 2009:

http://www.mailonsunday.co.uk/news/worldnews/article-1224377/British-nuclear-experts-17th-floor-UN-death-plunge-suicide.html An initial autopsy concluded that there were "no suspicious circumstances". But it is understood that Mr Hampton’s widow Olena Gryshcuk and her family were deeply unhappy with that verdict. Now a doctor who undertook a second post-mortem examination on behalf of the family believes she has found evidence that Mr Hampton did not die by his own hands. Professor Kathrin Yen, of the Ludwig Boltzmann Forensic Institute in Graz, Austria, which specialises in traumatology research, told the Mail on Sunday she had more tests to complete on Mr Hampton, who had a three-year-old son with Ms Gryshcuk. But she said one possible theory was that Mr Hampton was carried to the 17th floor from his workplace on the sixth floor and thrown to his death. Professor Yen used new forensic techniques to detect internal bruising caused by strangulation which would not be visible to the eye. She said, "In my opinion, it does not look like suicide. My example is that somebody took him up to the top floor and took him down. At the moment I don’t have the police reports. We did a CT scan. From the external exam, I saw injuries on the neck but these were not due to strangulation." It is expected to take three weeks for blood test results to come back. Austrian police said they believe Mr Hampton committed suicide. His body was discovered last Tuesday at about 8pm. Friends said it was usual for him to work late into the night. His widow, a weapons inspector for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), was working in Japan when her husband died.

Conclusion

In the absence of any further information, I should think that the explanation for Tim Hampton's death remains unresolved. The most likely thing is that he killed himself - because he could see that the failure of his computer system at the CTBTO to accurately monitor the DPRK-2009 event had consigned 10 years' worth of effort to the rubbish bin, instead of into the statute books and immortality.

Maybe next most likely is that his employers were so angry at his failures that they decided to bump him off.

And maybe the White House was really upset that their plan to get the CTBT through was ruined by a computer system which is working perfectly but fails to collect the critical data. The CIA would probably be used to do that kind of assassination work, and falling off balconies is definitely their style.

Then, of course, there is MI6 and Mossad.

Maybe he turned whistleblower, and maybe he was threatening to blow the story on how the US wants to paint Kim Jong-Il as a crazy man, so that it is justified in keeping its forward bases and troops in Japan and South Korea, where they are also well-placed to fight the Chinese over Taiwan.

Any more facts or opinions welcome.


Dave Kimble